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9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – SAN FRANCISCO		
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11	DANIEL L. BALSAM, an individual,	Case No. 09-CV	7-03585-CRB
12	Plaintiff,	Hon. Charles R. Breyer	
13	V.	<b>REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS TUCOWS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT</b>	
14 15	TUCOWS INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, TUCOWS CORP., a Mississippi corporation, ELLIOT NOSS, an individual, and PAUL		
16	KARKAS, an individual, and DOES 1-100,	DATE:	October 16, 2009 [Friday]
17	Defendants.	TIME: COURTROOM:	10:00 a.m. $8 - 19^{\text{th}}$ Floor
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## MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION

# I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

At bottom, this is an action against a "deep-pockets" corporation and two of its employees to recover an otherwise uncollectible default judgment entered in Plaintiff's favor against a known entity, Angeles Technology, Inc., not a party to the present lawsuit. <u>See</u>, Complaint, at ¶¶37, 57 (referencing the action *Balsam v. Angeles Technology, Inc. et al.*, No. CV 06-04114 JF, USDC, No. Dist. of Cal.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tucows, Inc. ("Tucows"), a domain name registrar, allowed Angeles Technology, Inc. – after its identity became known to Plaintiff – to opt into a privacy service that removed the contact data for the domain name "adultactioncam.com" from the worldwide whois database. Complaint, at ¶38. Plaintiff's incredible theory is that but for his inability to access the domain name registrant's contact details after they changed he would have been able to collect on his default judgment. Id., at ¶¶67-70. Just as this self-proclaimed anti-spam combatant builds honey pots to catch spam he claims he does not want, he has not undertaken *any discovery* to find the allegedly indispensible information he claims he needs. By this lawsuit, Plaintiff attempts to convert his own deliberate inaction into another's financial liability.

In this Reply Memorandum, Tucows and the other Defendants (Tucows Corp., Elliot Noss, and Paul Karkas) will demonstrate that Plaintiff Daniel Balsam's claims are wholly without merit. Each of the causes of action is based on a misreading of the operable contracts and the governing law, which the points of this Reply Memorandum will address in turn.

# II. <u>POINTS IN REPLY</u>

A.

# Plaintiff's Interpretation of the RAA Is Not Supportable

All of the causes of actions in this Complaint, even those sounding in tort, arise from supposed obligations to the public based on the Registrar Accreditation Agreement ("RAA") between ICANN and Tucows. Relying on contact interpretation precedent, which he applies when useful and ignores when convenient, Plaintiff claims that specific language controls over general language and contracts should be interpreted in a way that gives meaning to all provisions. *See*, Opposition, at pp. 5-9. These propositions are, of course, true. In this case, however, Plaintiff applies them to absurd results.

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First, to claim he is an intended third-party beneficiary, Plaintiff reads the word "third-" into the contract where it references only "party." The key to his contextual interpretation is a deliberate misreading of the RAA's Paragraph 3.7.7.3. In his Opposition Plaintiff explains: *"Liability in this Action turns on the phrase 'to a party.' Balsam submits that 'to a party' really means 'to a third party who has been harmed.'"* See, Opposition, at 7. That is an incredible statement. The phrase "to a party" in a contract between two parties is not ambiguous. As normally understood, a "party" to a contract is the opposite of a "third-party." Put another way, a "third-party" is "<u>not</u> a party." Plaintiff reads them as interchangeable.

Any fair reading of the RAA shows that Plaintiff's black-really-means-white interpretation is not reasonable.<sup>1</sup> The "parties" to the RAA are defined in the Definitions Section, Paragraphs 1.5 and 1.9 (in which both ICANN and the registrar are defined as "a party to this Agreement"). The RAA meticulously distinguishes between "party" and "third-party" throughout, using each word at least a dozen times. Rather than reading the Agreement as it was written, Plaintiff reads it as it suits him for his present purposes. An unreasonable interpretation of a contract provision is not sufficient, however, to defeat a motion to dismiss.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the RAA's "no third-party beneficiaries clause" should be read out of the contract entirely as a matter of contract interpretation. In doing so, Plaintiff virtually ignores existing federal court precedent interpreting the very contract provision at issue. *Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.*, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) is summarily dismissed in Plaintiff's Opposition as "not binding on this Court" (Opposition, at 12). That case is important, however, not only because it was decided by a sister court, but also because in it, ICANN, one of the parties to the RAA, offered its interpretation and contextual background for the clause and its important regulatory purpose.

In the Amicus Brief it filed in that case, ICANN wrote of the "no third party beneficiaries" clause:

It is difficult to imagine how the contractual language quoted above could more clearly exclude third-party beneficiary status. This language is by no means

A copy of the Registrar Accreditation Agreement at issue is attached to Tucows' Request for Judicial Notice, filed with this motion, at Exhibit "A."

"boilerplate," as characterized by Verio. Instead, it is language that was specifically drafted for the original Registrar Accreditation Agreement. It is vital to the overall scheme of the various agreements that enforcement of agreements with ICANN be informed by the judgment of the various segments of the Internet community as expressed through ICANN. In the fast-paced environment of the Internet, new issues and situations arise quickly, and sometimes the language of contractual provisions does not perfectly match the underlying policies. For this and other reasons, hard-and-fast enforcement of the letter of every term of every agreement is not always appropriate. An integral part of the agreements that the registrars and other participants entered with ICANN is the understanding that these situations would be handled through consultation and consideration within the ICANN process, including the various reconsideration, independent review, and other mechanisms available in that process. In the event a dispute cannot be resolved by these means, the parties further provided that a carefully calibrated procedure culminating in arbitration must be followed. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement sections II.P and II.N.

Allowing issues under the agreements registrars make with ICANN to be diverted from this carefully crafted remedial scheme to the courts, at the behest of third parties that are not responsible (as ICANN is) to implement the policies developed through community consensus, would seriously threaten the Internet community's ability, under the auspices of ICANN, to achieve a proper balance of the competing policy values that are so frequently involved.

If Verio had concerns regarding Register.com's conditions for access to Whois data, it should have raised them within the ICANN process rather simply taking Register.com's(11) data, violating the conditions, and then seeking to justify its violation in this Court by complaining that Register.com has breached an agreement that is intended to be addressed only within the ICANN process.

<u>See</u>, ICANN Amicus Brief, appended as Exhibit "B" to Tucows' Motion for Judicial Notice . Plaintiff ignores this important pleading, instead relying on an email from an ICANN employee, sent in regard to another matter involving another registrar, which he claims "implicitly confirms" his interpretation. Opposition, at 12-13. The ICANN amicus brief also directly contravenes Plaintiffs argument that the "no third-party beneficiaries clause" contravenes public policy. As explained by ICANN above, that provision is an important component of its regulatory environment, ensuring that Internet domain name policy is centrally coordinated under the ICANN regulatory umbrella.

When contract language is clear on its face and supported by substantial case law and a compelling, consistent interpretation by the party who drafted it, the Court must give it effect. In the

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present case, that means that Plaintiff's claims are plainly barred by the contract on which it seeks to build its case, and the Complaint must be dismissed.

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## The Wrongs In This Case Are of Plaintiff's Own Doing

Plaintiff claims he has been wronged and that, therefore, under the theory that "every wrong has a remedy," something in his Complaint must stick. *See*, Opposition at 5. The wrong alleged here is that contact information for the domain name adultactioncam.com was withheld from him upon an email request. By his own admission, however, he did not seek discovery from Tucows about the registrant's contact information, even though he was a party to an action in this very court in which he claimed that information was relevant. His claim that requiring a person to use legal process creates a chicken-and-egg problem because it would require him to file suit against someone whose identity was unknown to him (Opposition, at 10) ignores two core facts of which he is clearly aware: he can file suit against Doe defendants (this case names Does 1-100) and, most importantly, that he was already a plaintiff in an existing action.

He further claims he did not seek discovery because he thought that Tucows would not respond anyway, based on anecdotal evidence that Tucows does not respond to subpoenas. *See*, Opposition, at 10-11. In the normal case, however, a party seeking information from a third-party files third-party discovery. If the third-party doesn't respond, the party seeking discovery files a motion to compel. If the motion to compel is not answered, the party seeks sanctions, including a finding of contempt. Plaintiff had no problem finding and serving Tucows for purposes of filing this action. The idea that it can be forgiven its own procedural failings because it believed Tucows wouldn't respond is belied by this very motion. Tucows takes seriously its obligations to the Courts and responds when served.

#### C. <u>Non-Registrar Defendants Must Be Dismissed</u>

As described above, this action was brought because of a privacy service offered by Tucows, Inc. (the party referenced in this Reply Memorandum as "Tucows"), an ICANN-accredited domain name registrar. It centers on the interpretation of the RAA, a contract to which Tucows is a party, and all of the causes of actions, even those sounding in tort, arise from supposed obligations to the public based on the RAA. None of the other three Defendants is a registrar or a party to the RAA. The Defendants believe that the entire complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend, but the

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causes of action against the non-Tucows Defendants must be highlighted, if only because they underscore the bad faith behind this action.

Defendant Elliot Noss is the President and CEO of Tucows. The sole factual allegation in the Complaint regarding Mr. Noss is Paragraph 21: "BALSAM is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant ELLIOT NOSS ("NOSS") is now, and was at all times relevant herein, President and Chief Executive Officer of TUCOWS INC. and President of TUCOWS CORP." From that allegation alone, Plaintiff sues Mr. Noss for Negligence (Complaint, at ¶94-105), Civil Conspiracy (Id., at ¶106-110), and Declaratory Relief (Id., at ¶111-114). In his Opposition, Plaintiff claims only that "[o]fficers of corporations can be held liable for their personal unlawful conduct," (Opposition, at 13), yet he neither pleads "personal unlawful conduct" in his Complaint nor references any in his Opposition. What this makes clear is that Mr. Noss was sued only because he is the President and Chief Executive Officer, not because he personally participated in any way in the events described in the Complaint. The claim is clearly frivolous, and it is difficult to find any good faith basis on which it could have been brought.

For Mr. Karkas, Plaintiff alleges only that he is the Tucows employee with whom Plaintiff corresponded when he attempted to learn the identity of Tucows' domain name registration customer. Again, Mr. Karkas did not breach any contract provision to which he was a party or any duty that he owed expressly to Mr. Balsam. Tucows Corp., one of the four named Defendants, is not a registrar, nor has Plaintiff pleaded that it is. See, Complaint, at ¶¶16-20. Tucows Corp. is a subsidiary corporation that makes billing software. The fact that it is included in the Complaint, with the absurd allegation that it is a mere instrumentality of Tucows, underscore the lack of due diligence that Plaintiff put into its work. It appears to have been named only because it has a U.S. principal place of business, as opposed to Tucows, which has its main offices in Toronto, Ontario.

#### D. <u>No Leave To Amend</u>

Plaintiff claims that his Complaint should not be dismissed because he could amend it to state claims that would entitle him to relief. The amendments he proposes, however, are not to the causes of action he pleaded. His argument is that he could bring *new* causes of action under a variety of

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California statutes not now at issue. That is not a justification for granting him leave to amend the four causes of action now before this Court.

### III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

DATED: October 2, 2009

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Although he claims now that he was well aware of the no third-parties beneficiaries clause before he filed, all the evidence is to the contrary. Balsam and his counsel failed to read the contract before filing. To now defend himself against a motion to dismiss, Balsam makes argument that "party" means "third-party," and ignores an ICANN amicus brief on the public policy underpinnings of the "no third-party beneficiaries" clause, while arguing that the clause should be read out of the contract on public policy grounds. None of these arguments entitle him to maintain this action.

Plaintiff's theory that Defendants should be on the hook for a \$1,250,000 default judgment issued against another entity is pure nonsense, and this Court should acknowledge it as such and dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend.

Respectfully submitted,

# ADORNO YOSS ALVARADO & SMITH A Professional Corporation

By: /s/ Bret A. Fausett

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